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1.  Causes of the crisis: A drama with 
three actors 
The crisis that started in Greece culminated into a 
crisis of the Eurozone as a whole. How did we get into 
this mess? To answer this question it is useful to 
distinguish the three actors that have played a role in 
the development of the crisis: Greece, the financial 
markets (including the rating agencies) and the 
eurozone authorities. Let us analyse the role of these 
three actors in the drama. 
1.1 Greece 
The role of Greece can be summarised in just a few 
sentences. Mismanagement and deception by the 
Greek authorities made the crisis possible. The Greek 
government now struggles with a huge credibility 
problem, which makes the resolution of the crisis 
difficult, because “nobody trusts these guys anymore”. 
Any announcement by the Greek government about its 
intention to redress the budgetary situation will be met 
by great skepticism for years to come. 
1.2  The financial markets 
The destabilising role of financial markets has been 
illustrated dramatically again. Periods of euphoria 
alternate with periods of depression amplifying 
movements in asset prices that are unrelated to 
underlying fundamentals. This is not new, of course, 
but the speed with which this has occurred is baffling. 
Just a year ago, the sovereign bond markets were 
gripped by a bubble leading to record-low levels of 
long-term interest rates at a time when governments 
were adding unprecedented amounts of new bonds in 
the market. In a few weeks time, the situation turned 
around dramatically and bond markets crashed in a 
number of countries. 
The rating agencies take a central position in the 
destabilising role of the financial markets. One thing 
one can say about these agencies is that they 
systematically fail to see crises coming. And after the 
crisis erupts, they systematically overreact, thereby 
intensifying it. This was the case two years ago when 
the rating agencies were completely caught off guard 
by the credit crisis. It has again been the case during 
the last few months. The sovereign debt crisis started 
in Dubai. Only after Dubai postponed the repayment 
of its bonds and we had all read about it in the 
Financial Times, did the rating agencies realise there 
was a crisis and downgrade Dubai’s bonds. Having 
failed so miserably in forecasting a sovereign debt 
crisis, they went on a frantic search for other possible 
sovereign debt crises. They seized upon Greece, which 
of course was a natural target. But they did not limit 
their search to Greece. They ‘visited’ other countries, 
mostly southern European countries and started the 
process of downgrading. This in turn led to a 
significant increase in government bond rates in these 
countries.  
Thus, it can be said that the rating agencies make 
systematic ‘type I’ errors during periods of euphoria, 
i.e. they fail to cry wolf, when there are wolves in the 
forest. During periods of depression they make 
systematic ‘type II’ errors, i.e. they cry wolf all the 
time, when most of the wolves have left the forest. As 
a result, they amplify the destabilising movements in 
the financial markets.  
All this would not be so bad were it not that it prevents 
clear thinking about how to reduce budget deficits and 
government debt levels. The source of the explosion of 
government debt levels is the unsustainable levels of 
private debt prior to the financial crisis. During the 
boom years, the private sector added a lot of debt. 
Then the bust came and the governments picked up the 
pieces. They did this in two ways. First, as the 
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economy was driven into a recession, government 
revenues declined and social spending increased. 
Second, since part of the private debt was implicitly 
guaranteed by the government (bank debt in 
particular), the government was forced to issue its own 
debt to rescue private institutions.  
The present scare about excessive government debts 
risks setting in motion the so-called ‘Fisher paradox’ 
(Fisher, 1932). As governments are forced by rating 
agencies to reduce their debt levels, the further 
deleveraging of private sector debt is made impossible. 
The private sector can only reduce its debt if the 
government is willing to increase its own debt. Forcing 
the government to reduce its debt level today while the 
private sector also tries to reduce its own debt level 
leads to a self-defeating dynamics in which neither the 
private nor the public sectors succeed in reducing their 
debt. This dynamics then also pull down the economy 
into deflation. This dynamics that was analysed by 
Irving Fisher in the 1930s does not seem to be part of 
the intellectual tool kit of the rating agencies. 
1.3  The eurozone authorities 
The crisis was allowed to unfold because of hesitation 
on the part of and ambiguities created by both the 
eurozone governments and the European Central Bank 
(ECB). 
The eurozone governments failed to give a clear signal 
indicating their readiness to support Greece. The 
failure to do so mainly resulted from disagreements 
among member state governments concerning the 
appropriate response to the Greek crisis. 
The ECB, in turn, created ambiguities about the 
eligibility of Greek government debt to act as collateral 
in liquidity provision. As is well known, the ECB 
relies on ratings produced by American rating agencies 
to determine the eligibility of government bonds as 
collateral. Prior to the financial crisis, the minimal 
rating needed to be eligible was A- (or equivalent). In 
order to support the banking system during the banking 
crisis, the ECB temporarily lowered this to BBB+. At 
the end of 2009, however, the ECB announced that it 
would return to the pre-crisis minimal rating from the 
start of 2011 on. Since the Greek sovereign debt had 
been lowered to BBB+, this created a big problem for 
financial institutions holding Greek government bonds, 
which now face the prospect that their holdings of 
Greek government bonds may become extremely 
illiquid. No wonder so many market participants 
dumped Greek government bonds, precipitating the 
crisis. Similar uncertainties about the future ratings of 
other eurozone government bonds hang as a Damocles 
sword over the government bond markets in the 
eurozone.  
 
2.  What’s to be done: The short-run 
The Greek government debt crisis should be stopped. 
There are at least three reasons why it is imperative 
that this crisis be stopped. First, allowing the Greek 
crisis to lead to default risks leading to contagion that 
will affect other government bond markets in the 
eurozone. Second, and following up on the previous 
statement, such a contagion to other government bond 
markets will affect the banking sector in the eurozone. 
Many banks have started to recover from the banking 
crisis by arbitraging the yield curve, i.e. by borrowing 
short from the central bank at very low interest rates 
and investing in longer-term government bonds. The 
steepness of the yield curve has been an important 
source of profits for the banks. A crisis in the 
government bond markets, i.e. sharply declining bond 
prices, would lead to large losses on banks’ balance 
sheets, possibly triggering a new banking crisis in the 
eurozone. 
The third reason why the Greek government bond 
crisis needs to be stopped is at least as important as the 
first two. If not stopped, the crisis will lead to increases 
in government bond yields in a significant number of 
eurozone countries. This will put pressure on the 
governments of these countries to sharply contract 
fiscal policies, leading to deflationary effects and risk 
pulling down the eurozone economies into a double-
dip recession. Such an outcome would not only be bad 
news for the unemployed, but would also make it even 
more difficult for the eurozone countries to reduce 
their budget deficits and debt levels.  
There are quite a lot of analysts these days that 
welcome the discipline imposed by the market on the 
profligacy of governments. The high interest rates 
imposed by the markets will teach the bad 
governments to discipline their budgets, we are told by 
these analysts, which tend to be employed by major 
banks. The irony is that these analysts are able to tell 
us this good news today because the same bad 
governments saved them and their employers less than 
two years ago after years of unchecked profligacy. 
While there can be little doubt that the crisis must be 
stopped now rather than later, much doubt has been 
voiced that the European Union, or for that matter the 
member countries of the eurozone, have the means to 
do so. These doubts have been voiced both at the legal 
level and at the level of the financial capacity of the 
Union to organise a bail-out. 
The legal skeptics argue that the no-bail-out clause in 
the Treaty forbids the member states of the Union to 
provide financial assistance to another member state. 
But this is a misreading of the Treaty. The no-bail-out 
clause only says that the European Union shall not be 
liable for the debt of governments, i.e. the 
governments of the Union cannot be forced to bail-out 
a member state (see Article 103, section 1). But this Crisis in the eurozone and how to deal with it | 3 
does not exclude the possibility that the governments 
of the EU would freely decide to provide financial 
assistance to one of the member states. In fact this is 
explicitly laid down in Article 100, section 2: 
Where a Member State is in difficulties or is 
seriously threatened with severe difficulties 
caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences beyond its control, the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from 
the Commission, may grant, under certain 
conditions, Community financial assistance to 
the Member State concerned. 
Thus eurozone governments have the legal capacity to 
bail out other governments. 
There can be equally little doubt that the eurozone 
member countries have the financial capacity to bail-
out Greece if the need arises. It would not cost them 
that much. In the event that Greece were to default on 
the full amount of its outstanding debt, a bail-out by 
the other eurozone governments would add about 3% 
to these governments’ debt. A small number compared 
to the amounts added to save the banks during the 
financial crisis.  
One can conclude that the member countries of the 
eurozone have the legal and financial power to bailout 
Greece. The only obstacle appears to be political, i.e. 
the lack of consensus among the different member 
states about the necessity to do so. Happily, at the 
Summit meeting of 11 February, the European leaders 
announced their willingness to provide the financial 
means to support the Greek government were it to run 
into financial difficulties, while maintaining sufficient 
pressure on the Greek government to put its budgetary 
house in order.  
There is a risk, however, that this announcement will 
not be sufficient to pacify the financial markets. There 
is one important element missing. This is an 
announcement by the ECB about its collateral policy. 
As argued earlier, the uncertainty about what the ECB 
will do in the coming months with Greek government 
debt remains. The ECB should clearly signal that it 
will continue to accept Greek government debt as 
collateral, independently of the ratings concocted by 
the agencies. This was not announced by the ECB 
President Jean-Claude Trichet on 11 February. As a 
result, the recovery of the Greek government bond 
market will be made more difficult, thereby making 
the Greek budget-cutting exercise more painful and 
thus less successful.  
The experience we now have with the ECB policy 
regarding the eligibility of government bonds as 
collateral in liquidity provision leads to the conclusion 
that there is an urgent need for the ECB to change this 
policy. More precisely, the ECB should discontinue its 
policy of outsourcing country risk analysis to 
American rating agencies. The latter have a dismal 
record. As argued earlier, they have made systematic 
mistakes, underestimating risks in good times, and 
overestimating risks in bad times. Relying on these 
agencies to decide about such a crucial matter as the 
selection of government bonds is simply unacceptable. 
It helps to destabilise the financial markets in general 
and the eurozone in particular. Surely, the ECB should 
not be a primary source of financial instability in the 
eurozone. In addition, this policy gives tremendous 
power to a few rating agencies that simply do not 
deserve to wield so much power.  
The ECB is better placed to do the job of analysing the 
creditworthiness of member countries of the eurozone 
than the rating agencies. It has a pool of highly skilled 
analysts who are equally capable if not more so than 
the analysts working for the rating agencies.  
The reluctance of the ECB to do the credit analysis in-
house is probably due to the fear that it may sometimes 
have to take difficult stances that do not please 
national governments. It is much more comfortable to 
have this job done by outsiders. Such an abdication of 
responsibilities should not be allowed.  
3.  What’s to be done: The long term 
The crisis has exposed a structural problem of the 
eurozone that has been analysed by many economists 
in the past. This is the imbalance between full 
centralisation of monetary policy and the maintenance 
of almost all economic policy instruments (budgetary 
policies, wage policies, etc.) at the national level.  
Put differently the structural problem in the eurozone 
is created by the fact that the monetary union is not 
embedded in a political union. This imbalance leads to 
creeping divergencies between member states and no 
mechanism to correct or to alleviate them. These 
divergencies in turn are at the core of budgetary 
divergencies and crises. Figures 1 and 2 show the 
evidence of these structural problems. 
Figure 1 shows the well-known evolution of the 
relative unit labour costs (ULC) within the eurozone 
since the start in 1999. We observe how a few 
countries, namely Germany and Austria, experienced 
significant improvements of their competitive 
positions while Ireland, Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal saw their competitive positions deteriorate by 
more than 10%. These divergent developments have 
much to do with the fact that important economic 
decisions – about wage agreements, budgetary 
policies, social policies, credit regulations, etc. – are 
decided at the national level.  
These divergent movements in competitiveness also 
lead to budgetary divergences whereby countries that 
lose competitiveness experience a stronger 
deterioration of their budgetary situations. This is 
shown in Figure 2, where we plotted the relative unit 4 | Paul De Grauwe 
labour cost of each country (achieved in 2008) on the 
horizontal axis and the budget surplus (deficit) in 2008 
on the vertical axis. We observe a negative relationship 
confirming the proposition that countries that 
experience a deterioration of their competitive position 
(and increase in relative unit labour costs) also 
experience a deterioration of their budgetary position 
(and an increase in their budget deficits).  
Thus the lack of political integration leads to a build-
up of economic and budgetary divergencies leading to 
a crisis. When the crisis erupts, the same absence of 
political integration makes it difficult to resolve the 
crisis, as was illustrated in the previous sections.  
This structural problem has to be fixed before we are 
hit by the next crisis. But that is also the hard part. 
There is no appetite in the eurozone today for moving 
towards a more intense political union. Even the 
thought of adding just 0.1% to the EU budget makes 
some countries extremely jittery. Thus, a very small-
scale fiscal union that would transfer just a few 
percentage points with respect to budgetary and tax 
responsibilities appears to be out of the question.  
Figure 1. Relative unit labour costs in the eurozone 
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Figure 2. Relative unit labour costs (1999-2008) and budget surplus (+), deficit (-) 
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One is led to the conclusion that the inability to create 
a more intense political union in the eurozone will 
continue to make it a fragile construction, prone to 
crises and great turbulence each time such a crisis must 
be resolved.  
While a grand plan for political unification does not 
seem to be possible, smaller but focused steps towards 
such a future union can be taken. Two such steps are 
worth mentioning here. One is the idea of creating a 
European Monetary Fund (EMF), an idea recently put 
forward by Gros & Mayer (2010). The EMF would be 
a new European institution that would obtain its 
funding from countries with excessive budget deficits 
and debt levels. In times of crisis, it would have the 
means to support countries in need of financial 
assistance, while at the same time it would have the 
authority to impose conditions for the granting of 
financial assistance.  
A second step would consist of creating a common 
euro-bond market. Such a common euro-bond market 
was proposed by Gros & Micossi (2008) and De 
Grauwe & Moesen (2009). The latter propose to create 
new common euro government bonds in which each 
country would participate on a pro-rata basis of its 
capital share in the ECB. The interest rate each of the 
participating countries would have to pay would 
depend on the interest rates each of these governments 
pay when they issue bonds in their own markets. Thus, 
the more profligate governments like Greece would 
have to pay a higher interest rate than the more 
disciplined governments. The common bond interest 
rate would then be the weighted average of these 
national interest rates. Such a scheme would go a long 
way towards assuaging fears about moral hazard 
implicit in common bond issues – fears that are very 
strong in countries like Germany. In addition, by 
creating a new bond market with sufficient size, it 
would also be attractive to outside investors. 
These proposals are only small steps towards political 
unification. They have the important quality of being 
signals of a determination on the part of the members 
of the eurozone to commit themselves to a future 
intensification of the process of political union. Such 
signals are of crucial importance today. They make it 
clear that the members of the eurozone are serious in 
their desire to preserve their institution. Without these 
(or similar) steps, there can be little doubt that the 
eurozone has no future.  
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